基于进化博弈的节能减排监察分析  

Analysis on the Supervision of Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Based on the Evolutionary Game

作　　者：余孝军[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经学院数学与统计分院贵州省经济系统仿真重点实验室,贵州贵阳550004

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2011年第21期193-196,206,共5页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：贵州科学技术基金项目(2010J2131)

摘　　要：运用进化博弈理论建立两类不同的节能减排监察博弈模型,分析企业和监察部门之间的行为选择,得到各个博弈方的复制动态方程,探讨博弈模型在不同情形下的进化稳定策略。研究结果表明企业和监察部门在有限理性基础上得到的进化稳定策略与博弈双方的收益、系统所处的初始状态有关,并根据博弈模型,提出建议。Two kinds of energy conservation and emission reduction supervision games model are formulated by using the evolutionary game theory. The behaviors choice between the enterprise and the department of supervision is analyzed. The duplicative dynamic equation of each player in those games is obtained and the evolutionary stable strategy of those game models in different circumstances is investigated. It is showed that the evolutionary stable strategy of the enterprise and the department of supervision based on bounded rationality depend on the payoff of each player and the initial state of the system. Finally, some reasonable advices based on the evolutionary game model are proposed.

关 键 词：节能减排 监察 进化博弈 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]