基于自偿性贸易融资的银行—企业博弈分析  

Analysis of the Gaming between Banks and Enterprises under Self-liquidating Trade Finance

作　　者：温源[1] 叶青[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《中国软科学》2011年第10期54-60,共7页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70901045;70890082)

摘　　要：物流金融创新为解决中小企业融资难题开辟了新的途径。分析了其中一种典型模式——自偿性贸易融资中的银企博弈,证明银行决定利率和质押率、企业决定采购量的博弈均衡存在且唯一,并得到显式解。研究表明:过高的融资成本令企业参与经营的积极性下降;放宽银行利率浮动范围可提高银行放贷积极性,从而降低企业总体融资成本;银行期望利润与企业自筹资金成本无关;对市场前景的准确把握有助于银企双方减小经营风险;利率和质押率扮演不同的角色,两者配合使用可令银企双方均达到更优的绩效水平。Logistic financing innovations serve as a new approach to the financing problem for Small and Medium Enterprises（SMEs）.Self-liquidating trade finance（STF）is a prevalent mode among these innovations.The bank offers interest rate and loan-to-value ratio,and then the SME makes procurement decision.The existence and uniqueness of the games＇ equilibrium are proved with close form solution.The model shows that higher financing cost results in the setback of doing business for SMEs.A rise in the upper limit of the bank＇s rate may stimulate the bank＇s initiative of lending and reduce the SMEs＇ financing cost.The bank＇s expected profit is irrelevant to the cost rate of the SMEs＇ own capital.A more accurate demand forecast also helps reduce the risks for both agents.Rate and ratio play different roles in the games.Well use of these two tools improves the performance of both agents.

关 键 词：物流金融 创新 自偿性贸易融资 利率 质押率 

分 类 号：F830.56[经济管理—金融学]