能力短缺条件下的双边动员博弈——政府维稳与“公民闹大”及其关系  

Bilateral Mobilization Game under the Condition of Capability Shortage——The relationship between government's maintaining stability and citizens' trouble-making

作　　者：韩志明[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津师范大学政治与行政学院,天津300387

出　　处：《江苏行政学院学报》2011年第6期110-115,共6页The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学基金青年项目<公民问责的理论与实践研究>(09CZZ031);教育部人文社会科学一般项目<公民网络问责:案例跟踪与制度研究>(10YJA810039)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：政府维稳与"公民闹大"已经成为当代中国公共治理的重要旋律。两者都是为了解决能力短缺问题所采取的行动策略,其目的是要动员、整合和利用资源,以实现彼此的目标。在政府与公民关系的框架下把握基于维稳与闹大所形成的关系,从资源及其动员的角度分析政府维稳与公民闹大的动员机制及其行动逻辑,揭示这种博弈关系发展所带来的公共治理的负面后果,不仅可以为我们理解纷繁复杂的公共治理现象提供一个清晰的框架,也有利于把握政府及其官员与公民的行为逻辑。Government＇s maintaining stability and citizens＇ trouble-making has become an important melody in China＇s public administration. Both are action strategies to resolve capability shortage aiming to mobilize, integrate and take advantage of resources so as to achieve mutual purposes. To handle the relationship under the framework of the relationship between government and citizens, to analyze the mobilization mechanism and action logic from the angle of resources and mobilization, to uncover the negative outcomes in public administration brought about by the development of this game relation can not only offer a clear framework for us to understand complex public administration phenomena but do good to understand the action logic of government, officials and citizens.

关 键 词：能力短缺 政府维稳 公民闹大 资源 动员 

分 类 号：D035.29[政治法律—政治学]