管理层权力与高管薪酬粘性  

Managerial Power and Executive Compensation Stickiness

作　　者：高文亮[1] 罗宏[2] 程培先[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北金融学院会计系,河北保定071051 [2]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《经济经纬》2011年第6期82-86,共5页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家社科基金(10XJL012)的阶段性成果

摘　　要："最优契约论"与"管理权力论"是目前管理者激励领域研究的两种主要理论基础。我国上市公司高管薪酬与国外资本市场上公司高管薪酬一样具有粘性特征,这与"最优契约论"的观点不符。薪酬粘性是指高管薪酬的业绩敏感性存在不对称的特征,业绩上升时薪酬的增加幅度显著高于业绩下降时薪酬的减少幅度。笔者研究发现,管理层权力型企业的高管薪酬显著高于非管理层权力型企业的高管薪酬,并具有更高薪酬粘性。＂Optimal contract theory＂ and ＂managerial power theory＂ are the two main theoretical bases in the research field of the in- centives of managers. Just like the managerial compensation in foreign capital market, the executive compensation in the listed compa- nies of our country has the characteristic of stickiness, which does not match with the view of ＂optimal contract theory＂. Compensation stickiness refers to that the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance has the asymmetry feature. When performance increa- ses, the rate of salary increase is significantly higher than the rate of salary decrease when performance reduces. The authors found that the salary of executives in enterprises where managers have more power is significantly higher than that in enterprises where managers have less power and has higher compensation stickiness.

关 键 词：管理层权力论 薪酬粘性 异常薪酬 

分 类 号：F235.19[经济管理—会计学]