权威命题与法律理由的性质:一个反思性的评论  

The Authority Thesis and the Nature of Legal Reasons:A Reflective Comment

作　　者：朱振[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学理论法学研究中心,吉林长春130012

出　　处：《法制与社会发展》2011年第6期94-105,共12页Law and Social Development

基　　金：吉林大学科学前沿与交叉学科创新项目"规范推理的逻辑规则:形式逻辑批判与规范逻辑的可能性"(2010JC022);国家社科基金青年项目"法律的权威性:基于实践哲学的研究"(08CFX003)

摘　　要：法律理由的排他性与内容独立性是支撑权威命题的基础,也是排他性法律实证主义与其他法哲学流派相竞争的根据。Wilfrid Waluchow、Heidi Hurd与Larry Alexander对法律理由性质的批评都不足以推翻法律的排他性,但排他性并不必然产生义务,因此既要坚持以法律的制度性为基础的实践权威的特征,又要改进权威合法性的证成模式,使得权威理由能够产生服从的道德义务。法律的规范性不是一个事实问题而是一个证成问题,民主参与的因素可以把实践权威的排他性与行动者实践推理的内在性结合起来,从而权威可以使服从者产生服从的道德义务。The exclusion and content-independence of legal reasons underlie the authority thesis and offer the grounds on which the exclusive legal positivism compete with other schools of legal philosophy.The comments about the nature of legal reasons from Wilfrid Waluchow,Heidi Hurd and Larry Alexander are not enough to cancel the exclusionary legal reasons.But the exclusion does not necessarily bring the obligaiton,so we should insist on claiming the feathers of practical authority based on legal institutionity,on the one hand,and improve the justification model of legitimate authority,on the other,that makes authoritative reasons give birth to the obligation to obey.Legal normativity is not a matter of fact,but jusitification,and the democratic considerations can combine the exclusion of practical authority with the internal practical reasoning of the agents,accordingly,authority may make obligation to obey for subjects.

关 键 词：权威 排他性理由 优先命题 

分 类 号：D90[政治法律—法学理论]