回收再制造系统的重复博弈模型及复杂性分析  

Modeling and Analysis of Recycling and Remanufacturing Systems by Using Repeated Game Model

作　　者：郭悦红[1,2] 马军海[1] 王冠辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300170 [2]天津职业技术师范大学经济与管理学院,天津300222

出　　处：《工业工程》2011年第5期66-70,共5页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：天津市哲学社会科学项目(P20100076);天津市科技发展战略研究计划项目(10ZLZLZF03800)

摘　　要：利用重复博弈理论和复杂系统理论,建立了以回收价格为决策变量,以边际利润为决策依据的数学模型。通过数值模拟,得出3个结论:1)对回收价格进行调整,得出价格调整幅度越大,回收市场的混沌状态越复杂;2)再造品的销售价格超过临界值时,回收市场进入混沌状态;3)回收市场对回收价格的初始值具有敏感性,初始值的微小变化可能会引起回收市场价格很大波动。该结论为制造商指导确定每阶段的最佳回收价格提供决策依据,以实现收益最大化。Recycling and remanufacturing are effective way for rational use of the resources and environ- mental protection. To make recycling and remanufacturing possible, the recycling and remanufacturing system should be profitable. A repeated game model is developed to describe such a system. By using this model, one can analyze the relationship between the marginal profit and the recycling price which is the decision variable in the model. With this model, numerical simulation is performed and results show that： 1 ） when the price is adjusted for the profit, the larger the adjusting range of the price is, the more complex the recycling market chaotic state is ; 2） when the price of the remanufactured products exceeds a critical value the recycling market enters a chaotic state; and 3 ） the recycling market is sensitive to the initial recycling price, a minor change of initial recycling price can cause a large fluctuation of the recycling market. These results can be used as the guideline for profit maximization in recycling and remanufacturing.

关 键 词：重复博弈 再制造 混沌 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]