契约、承诺与制度：来自中国股改的证据  

Contract,Commitment and Institutions:Evidence from the 2005 Ownership Reform in China

作　　者：桂荷发[1] 蔡明超[2] 石劲[1,3] 汪勇祥[4,3] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学金融学院,330013 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济管理学院,200052 [3]中澳亚太资本市场研究中心 [4]江西财经大学

出　　处：《经济研究》2011年第11期103-115,共13页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金课题“多重背景风险关联下的生命周期投资模型”(70971088)、国家自然科学基金地区项目“股票融资、股市周期与产业结构升级研究”(71063004);教育部人文社科规划项目“资产价格泡沫形成与综合治理研究”(08JA790059)的阶段性成果;江西财经大学“资本市场与行为公司金融理论国际学术创新团队”项目的资助

摘　　要：尽管经济学者已经从理论上对金融契约中承诺的作用进行了大量分析,然而由于研究环境所限,目前依然缺乏该方面的实证研究。本文借助中国股权分置改革的数据,对金融契约中的承诺进行了系统的分析。结果表明:承诺降低了非流通股股东的股改成本;同时,流通股股东也对承诺作出了正面的积极的反应。因此,整体上看,承诺具有经济价值,起着帕累托改进的作用。但是,我们的分析同时也表明,并非所有的大股东都可以作出被流通股股东所接受的承诺,承诺的价值依赖于承诺方的信誉和其所处的契约环境。这意味着政府致力于改善契约环境,将有利于提高经济效率。Although these have been so many theory papers looking into the value of commitment in the contracting process,empirical analyses remain rare. In this paper, by investigating the ownership split reform in China, we empirically analyze the role of commitment. Our results show that commitment plays an important role in the contracting process：It decreases the reform costs for the nontradable shareholders and tradable shareholders also positively respond to the commitment. Thus, overall making commitment has economic value and is a Pareto improvement. However,our further analyses also reveal that not all nontradable shareholders can make credible commitment that would be accepted by tradable shareholders：The economic value of commitment depends on the reputation and also on the contracting environments. This implies that governments dedicate to improving contracting environments will be helpful to improve economic efficiency.

关 键 词：承诺 契约过程 股权分置改革 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F224