第一价格密封拍卖中的最优保留价和最优佣金率研究  

Study on Optimal Reserve Price and Optimal Commission Rate of a First-price Sealed-bid Auction Model

作　　者：刘树林[1] 杨卫星[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院数量经济学系,100029 [2]北京化工大学理学院数学系

出　　处：《经济研究》2011年第11期145-156,共12页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71171052);新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-05-0159)的资助

摘　　要：在独立私人估价拍卖模型的框架下,本文研究了同时含有保留价和佣金率两个参数的第一价格密封拍卖模型,得到结论及对策建议:(1)投标者的均衡报价关于佣金率递减,但它关于保留价递增;投标者的预期收益与佣金率和保留价均呈反向变动。(2)卖者存在唯一的最优保留价且关于佣金率呈反向变动。(3)考虑卖者委托拍卖行设置保留价的情形,此时拍卖行存在唯一的最优保留价且关于佣金率呈反向变动。(4)拍卖行设置的最优保留价小于卖者设置的最优保留价。(5)考虑拍卖行的最优佣金率问题,并给出最优佣金率满足的条件。(6)卖者自己设置保留价,而不是由委托拍卖行设置,进而实现自己收益的最大化;拍卖行应该在法规允许的范围内,设置一个最优佣金率,从而使自己的收益达到最大化。Based on the assumptions in the independent private value auction model, this paper studies the first price sealed- bid auction model with two parameters of a reserve price and a commission rate. This paper concludes that （ 1 ） the bidder＇ s equilibrium bidding strategy is deceasing in the commission rate and increasing in the reserve price ; the bidder＇ s expected revenue is deceasing in both the commission rate the reserve price. （2） there exists an unique optimal reserve price for the seller, which is deceasing in the commission rate. （3） for the first time we consider the case in which the reserve price might be determined by the auction house; in this case, there also exists an unique optimal reserve price for the auction house, which is also deceasing in the commission rate. （4） the optimal reserve price for the auction house is less than that for the seller. （5） for the first time, we consider a problem of the auction house＇ s optimal commission rate and give conditions for its existence. （6） the seller should try to set the optimal reserve price by himself instead of the auctioneer in order to maximize his expected revenue; the auction house should set the optimal commission rate to maximize his expected revenue which is limited to the auction law.

关 键 词：独立私人估价拍卖模型 第一价格密封拍卖 最优佣金率 最优保留价 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F713.359