非对称信息下农地规模经营者的激励与监督  

Incentive and Supervision about Scale Operator of Agricultural Land under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：段力誌[1] 傅鸿源[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学建设管理与房地产学院,重庆400045

出　　处：《软科学》2011年第6期36-39,共4页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(59278369);重庆市建设科研项目(2008-103)

摘　　要：运用信息经济学的相关理论,构建了关于我国农地规模经营者的激励与监督机制的定性分析框架和定量决策模型。通过在信息不对称条件下的模型均衡结果的分析,刻画了报酬契约最优激励因子的影响因素及变化规律、激励强度与监督成本的耦合机理及其对农地规模经营者经济行为的影响,并得出了一系列有益的技术性结论。In view of the theory about information economics, the analysis framework＇and decision model about scale operator＇s incentives and supervision mechanism from rural land transfer project are constructed. By analyzing the equilibrium results of model under asymmetric information, the factors and variations affecting the contract＇s optimal incentive co- efficient, coupling mechanism between incentive coefficient and supervision cost, and their influences on agent＇s behavior are portrayed. Moreover, a series of useful technical conclusions are obtained.

关 键 词：非对称信息 农地流转 规模经营者 激励与监督 

分 类 号：F323.211[经济管理—产业经济]