流域初始水权分配中强弱势群体间的演化博弈分析  

Analysis of Evolutionary Game between Strong Group and Vulnerable Group in Initial Water Rights Allocation

作　　者：陈艳萍[1] 吴凤平[1] 周晔[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,南京210098

出　　处：《软科学》2011年第7期11-15,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家"十一五"科技支撑计划重点项目(2007BAB28B03);河海大学"211工程"三期重点学科子项目;河海大学校级重点学科项目

摘　　要：将流域中的区域分成弱势群体和强势群体,建立弱势群体和强势群体间的演化博弈模型,分析各群体的复制动态和演化稳定策略,演化博弈系统的稳定性。研究表明,两群体间的演化博弈存在唯一的演化稳定策略:强势群体选择"放弃水权量q"策略,而弱势群体为了防止强势群体改变策略,必须总是选择"引发冲突"策略。根据演化稳定策略调整各区域的水权,可以有效化解初始水权分配中强弱势群体间的冲突,从而构造和谐有序的用水环境。提出从政策倾斜、经济补偿和生态补偿三方面保护弱势群体利益的相关建议。The regions in a river basin are divided into strong group and vulnerable group.By building evolutionary game model of the two groups,the replicate dynamics and evolutionary stable strategy（ESS） of both groups and the stability of the evolutionary game system are analyzed.The study shows： there is a unique ESS of the evolutionary game between the two groups;if strong group chooses the strategy of ＂giving up water right amount q＂,vulnerable group has to choose the strategy of ＂triggering conflicts＂ to prevent strong group changing strategy.If each region＇s initial water right is adjusted according to ESS,the conflicts between strong group and vulnerable group would be eliminated,and harmonious and orderly environment for using water resource would be set up.Finally,some suggestions for protecting vulnerable group are put forward from preferential policies,economic compensation and ecological compensation.

关 键 词：初始水权分配 冲突 弱势群体 强势群体 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学]