贷款市场中基于最优博弈策略的激励契约  

Incentive Contract Based on Optimal Game Strategy in Loan Market

作　　者：王雷[1] 李萍[1] 冯立超[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学数学与统计学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《应用数学》2008年第S1期40-42,共3页Mathematica Applicata

摘　　要：信贷风险是商业银行主要的信用风险,信贷风险分为企业的经营风险和企业违约赖账的道德风险.本文运用相关知识建立了双方的博弈模型,讨论了均衡状态下双方的最优博弈策略,通过制定合理的利率水平和惩罚力度来激励借款人按合同规定投资某项目而不去投资高风险项目,以达到有效控制道德风险的目的.This paper studies moral risk of commercial bank,the main idea is to establish game model between bank and corporation,the optimal game strategy is discussed as follows,and then the incentive mechanism is presented by setting reasonable interest rate and penalty policy,which ensures the borrowers invest in the project specified in contract rather than other high-risk project.

关 键 词：道德风险 博弈分析 激励契约 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F830.5