中国地方政府非正式财权研究:“逆向软预算约束”观察视角  

Local Governments' Informal Property Rights in China:Based on Analysis of Adverse Soft-budget Constraint

作　　者：唐明[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经贸学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《财经论丛》2011年第6期33-38,共6页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(11CJY091);湖南大学985工程"两型社会创新基地"项目;2011年湖南大学"中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金支持项目

摘　　要：在正式体制内地方政府财政收支巨大缺口的压力背景下,地方政府面临相对"软化"的制度约束环境,激烈的政府间竞争和政绩显示需要加剧财政收支缺口压力,这使得地方政府突破体制内预算约束的限制,"由上而下"地对"软预算约束"资源的攫取非正式财权(各种苛捐杂费、负债以及土地财政等),滋生出"逆向软预算约束"的体制外非正式财权的运行"潜规则"。从本质上看,中国地方政府非正式财权是中央政府对地方政府以及地方政府对市场和私人部门两类政府机会主义行为恶性循环综合作用的产物,而有效防止和化解这两类机会主义行为的综合改革才能从根本上解决地方政府非正式财权产生的问题。With local governments＇ revenue and expenditure huge gap pressure in the formal system, local governments are confronted with a relatively ＂ softer＂ system of institutional environmental constraints during the transition period. Intense intergovemmental competition and the need of political achievements shows have exacerbated the gap of local governments＇ revenue and expenditure, so local governments have broken through budget constraints and grabbed ＂soft budget constraint＂ resources from top to bottom for informal property rights, such as a variety of harsh charges, debts and ＂land finance＂ . Local governments have bred ＂hidden rules＂ of reverse soft - budget constraints out of the system. In essence, local governments＇ informal property rights are the product of combined effects and vicious circles of the two types of government＇s opportunistic behaviors that central government poses on local governments, and then local governments pose it on the market. As a result, effectively preventing and resolving the two types of government＇s opportunistic behaviors can solve a series of issues caused by local governments＇ informal property rights fundamentally.

关 键 词：地方政府 非正式财权 逆向软预算约束 土地财政 制度环境 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]