审计委员会、盈余质量与意见购买——来自2002-2008年中国上市公司的经验证据  

Audit Committee,Earnings Quality and Opinion Shopping —Empirical Evidences from China Listed Companies during 2002-2008

作　　者：唐跃军[1] 左晶晶[2] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学管理学院,上海200433 [2]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2011年第11期78-88,共11页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70802015);教育部博士点新教师基金项目(200802461116)

摘　　要：文章主要探讨审计委员会治理、盈余质量对上市公司年报审计意见类型以及不利审计意见改善和审计意见恶化的影响,考察审计委员会对公司管理层审计意见购买行为的治理作用。研究表明,设立审计委员会的上市公司年报被出具非标准审计意见的可能性更低;在结合考虑盈余质量之后发现,审计委员会拥有双重的治理作用,在董事会中设立审计委员会并切实提高审计委员会的独立性和勤勉程度,不仅有助于提升上市公司财务报告的质量,而且亦有助于对卷入盈余管理的管理层的审计意见购买行为进行较为有效的制衡。The paper discusses the impacts of audit committee governance and earnings quality on the likelihood of receiving modified audit opinion, and the likelihood of the improvement and deterioration of audit opinion. Furthermore, it explores the governance effects of audit committee on audit opinion shopping of the management. Empirical analysis indicates that： listed companies with audit committees have lower likelihood of receiving modified audit opinions than other listed companies. Audit committee has dual governance effect. When considering earning quality, the existence, independence and diligence degree of audit committee not only improve the quality of financial reports published by listed companies but also counterbalance behaviors of audit opinion shopping of the management involving in earnings management.

关 键 词：审计委员会 独立性 勤勉程度 盈余质量 异常非经常损益 

分 类 号：F425[经济管理—产业经济] F406.7