信用评级机构监管的演化动态博弈分析  

Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric Game between CRAs and Relating Regulators

作　　者：刘晓剑[1] 张强[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学金融与统计学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2011年第6期30-34,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：湖南省科技厅软科学一般项目<湖南省信用评级体系的运行与优化研究>(2011ZK3107);国家自然科学基金<中国债券市场监管标准研究>(71073050);湖南大学中央高校基本科研业务专项资金<声誉约束机制下信用评级机构的政府监管研究>

摘　　要：席卷全球的金融危机再一次证明了信用评级机构监管的必要性和重要性。在有限理性条件下,信用评级机构与监管主体行为博弈复制系统中存在五个均衡点,且在四种不同的情况下,演化趋向于不同的均衡点。分析结果证明,想要促进信用评级机构的公正行为,需要监管主体从四个方向入手:强化惩罚力度、充分发挥声誉约束、缩小非公正评级额外收益及提高监管效率。The worldwide financial crisis shows us again the importance and indispensability of the regulation on the crediting rating agencies. Under the conditions of limited rationality, these are five equilibrium points in the replication system of game between credit rating agencies and regulators. And in four different situations, it closes to different equilibriums. The results prove that four ways can be used by regulators to control the illegal behaviors of credit rating agencies, including imposing severe penalty, prompting reputational constraint, bridging the revenue gap between illegal and legal behaviors and improving the regulation efficiency.

关 键 词：信用评级机构 政府监管 演化博弈 动态复制 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]