农业非点源污染控制中政府与农户的博弈分析  

Analysis on the Game between Government and Farmers in Agricultural Non-point Source Pollution Control

作　　者：杨小山[1,2] 金德凌[1] 

机构地区：[1]闽江学院管理学系,福建福州350108 [2]福建农林大学植物病毒研究所,福建福州350002

出　　处：《山西农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第9期898-901,944,共5页Journal of Shanxi Agricultural University:Social Science Edition

基　　金：福建省自然科学基金项目(2010J05148);福建省教育厅项目(JBS10152);闽江学院科研资助项目(YSY08008)

摘　　要：首先从宏观政策调控与引导、法律法规约束、技术支持三个方面分析了农业非点源污染控制中的政府行为,然后探讨了农业非点源污染控制中的农户行为,认为农户是有限理性的。基于此,运用不完全信息静态博弈模型理论探索政府在农业非点源污染控制中的最优战略,指出政府达到最优配置的条件以及三类约束条件,最后结合实际情况,提出次优配置方案是一种可行的方案。Firstly, government behavior in agricultural non-point source pollution control is analyzed from three aspects of the macroscopical policy control and guidance, laws and regulations constraint and technical support.And then,f armers behavior is discussed and considered as limited rational.By using the static game model with incomplete information,i t explored an optimal strategy for government and pointed out the government conditions of achieving optimal allocation and three types of constraint conditions.Finally, combined with the actual situation, it proposed that sub-optimal allocation is a feasible option.

关 键 词：农业非点源污染 静态博弈 政府行为 农户行为 

分 类 号：F323.22[经济管理—产业经济]