股权集中、控制权配置与公司非效率投资行为——兼论大股东的监督抑或合谋?  

Ownership concentration,allocation of control rights and inefficient investment in firms: Monitoring or colluding among multiple large shareholders?

作　　者：窦炜[1,2] 刘星[1] 安灵[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]武汉科技大学管理学院,武汉430081 [3]重庆理工大学财会研究与开发中心,重庆400054

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2011年第11期81-96,共16页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772100);教育部博士点基金资助项目(教技发中心函[2006]226号);重庆大学2010"笹川优秀青年教育基金奖学金"资助项目

摘　　要：本文通过分析不同控制权配置模式下的企业投资行为决策模型,对大股东控制下的企业不同控制权配置形态与非效率投资行为的关系进行了研究,并利用我国上市公司2000—2008年间的数据进行了实证检验.结果表明,在大股东绝对控股条件下,企业的过度投资扭曲程度与控股大股东持股比例呈负相关关系,而投资不足则与其呈现出正相关关系;在多个大股东共同控制条件下,企业的非效率投资行为会根据多个大股东之间的监督或共谋而呈现出不同,当多个大股东互相监督时,企业的过度投资行为将得到缓解,而投资不足加强;而当多个大股东互相共谋,形成股东联盟时,企业过度投资行为将会加强,而投资不足缓解.By analyzing the enterprise investment behaviors under different allocations of control rights, we study the relationship between the allocation of control rights and the inefficient investment behaviors under the condition of large shareholder controlling. And a empirical study by the sample data of the listed companies during 2000--2008 are used to verify our conclusion. We show that in the case of one large shareholder controlling, the over-investment behavior is anti-correlated with share proportion, while the underinvestment is correlated with the proportion of the large shareholder. In the case of multiple shareholders controlling, the inefficient investment behaviors depend on whether the relationship of the shareholders is monitoring or cooperating： the over-investment is alleviated and the underinvestment is accentuated if shareholders monitoring each other, while the over-investment is accentuated and the investment-deficiency is alleviated if shareholders cooperate with each other.

关 键 词：大股东 控制权配置 非效率投资 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]