考虑成本声誉的动态供应链激励契约  

Dynamic supply chain incentive contract with the reputation caused by cost

作　　者：郭红梅[1] 汪贤裕[1] 王新辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,四川成都610064

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2011年第11期2483-2492,共10页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071103)~~

摘　　要：为解决在制造商的成本类型信息不对称情形下销售商对制造商的多阶段激励问题,运用动态博弈和委托代理理论,提出了考虑制造商成本声誉的动态供应链激励契约模型。研究表明,在单阶段合作时,最优静态契约能激励制造商显示真实成本类型;但在销售商和制造商两期短期合作关系下,棘轮效应的存在使显示原理不再成立;提出考虑制造商成本声誉的激励契约,并得出声誉补偿与制造商显示的成本类型之间的关系,达到弱化棘轮效应的效果。通过具体算例分析了契约的实施。To study the multi-period incentive problem under asymmetric information of the manufacturing cost type in a retailer-led supply chain,a dynamic supply chain incentive contract model with the reputation caused by manufacturer cost was proposed by using the dynamic game and principal-agent theory.The research revealed that the optimal static contract could motivate the manufacturer to show the true type within one-period cooperation,but the revelation principle was no longer correct in two short-term cooperation relationship because of the ratchet effect.Under this circumstance,a model considering the reputation caused by manufacturer cost was set up to conclude the relationship between compensation for reputation and cost type of manufacturer displayed.Thus the ratchet effect was reduced.The numerical example was used to explain the specific implementation of the contract.

关 键 词：委托代理 动态博弈 棘轮效应 声誉 不对称信息 供应链 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]