政府支农专项资金监管的博弈模型分析  

Game Model Analysis on Government Supervision of Special Funds for Supporting Agriculture

作　　者：章新蓉[1] 王杏芬[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学会计学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《经济问题》2011年第12期56-58,61,共4页On Economic Problems

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(10XJY039);教育部人文社会科学规划基金资助项目(10YJA790191)

摘　　要：通过构建不完全信息的静态和动态博弈模型对舞弊者与检查者收益函数进行了合理设计,并对二者之间的关系进行了详细分析。分析结果表明,与政府自查相比,独立第三方监管可以更好地降低检查成本,提高发现舞弊的能力和投资绩效。但不能片面重罚舞弊者或片面加大对监管者的奖惩力度,否则会使支农专项资金监管存在激励悖论。同时,应考虑检查者的学习效应,综合运用加大检查频率、持续提高检查能力、降低检查成本等措施,最终提高惠农政策的效果。Constructing the static and dynamic game model on incomplete information, the article designed reasonably gain functions about the frauder and examiner, and analyzed the relationship between them in detail. The results show that compared with the self- examination by the governor, an independent third party monitoring can better reduce inspection costs and improve the ability to detect fraud and investment performance. However, heavy penalties can not be acted one - sided or increase one - sided the level of fraud control efforts by the, otherwise special funds regulation for supporting agriculture will inspire consider the learning effect of the examiner, the integrated use incentive paradox. Meanwhile, the regulator should of increased inspection frequency, and continuing to improve inspection capabilities, reducing inspection costs and other measures in order to improve greatly the effect of such preferential agricultural policies.

关 键 词：政府支农专项资金 博弈 监管 

分 类 号：F810.4[经济管理—财政学]