中国上市公司非经常性损益列报的监管惩戒考察  

Study on the Supervision and Punishment of Presentation of Nonrecurring Items in Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：郑珺[1] 樊行健[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川师范大学数软学院会计系,四川成都610021 [2]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都610074

出　　处：《广东金融学院学报》2011年第6期61-71,共11页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(10YJC630410)

摘　　要：根据1999～2009年证监会与交易所查处的非经常性损益列报违规事件的统计资料,发现此类违规行为的违规成本低,体现在其被查处的概率低和惩罚力度弱。为了保护投资者利益,保证金融市场健康有序发展,可考虑完善资本市场民事赔偿制度,建立集团诉讼机制,借助惩戒机制来加大违规成本。With statistics from China Securities Regulatory Commission and exchange houses from 1999 to 2009, this paper investigates the real supervision and punishment of nonrecurring profit and loss. It obtains the following main findings： （ 1 ） Such violations are investigated and dealt with low probability, （2） Even if that punishment is investigated, the treatment is neither severe. The gauge of disobey cost is low. In order to protect the interests of investors and ensure the healthy development of financial market, it may be considered to improve the legal system of civil compensation, establish group litigation system, and enlarge disobey cost.

关 键 词：非经常性损益 监管 惩戒 

分 类 号：F830.41[经济管理—金融学]