针对窃听问题的马尔可夫博弈路由模型的研究  

Markov Game Theory Based Routing Countering Eavesdropping

作　　者：马争先[1] 董荣胜[1] 王玉斌[1] 刘建明[1] 

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学计算机科学与工程学院,桂林541004

出　　处：《计算机科学》2011年第11期34-36,47,共4页Computer Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(60762002);广西自然科学基金项目(0991242)资助

摘　　要：在随机路由的基础上,给出一种针对窃听问题的马尔可夫博弈路由模型(Markov Game Theory-based Rou-ting,MGBR)。给出的模型以发送者和窃听者为马尔可夫博弈双方,发送者通过概率进行数据传输,增加了窃听者窃听信息的难度。模型通过收益函数计算纳什均衡点,找出最优路径。使用PRISM工具进行仿真,结果表明MGBR中存在纳什均衡点,在纳什均衡点处信息被窃听的概率最小;给出信息在纳什均衡点处被窃听的概率变化趋势,与基于最小跳数算法的路由协议相比,它降低了信息被窃听的概率。To reduce the probability of eavesdropping in wireless sensor networks,this paper proposed a Markov game theory based routing（MGBR）to counter tapping problems under stochastic routing.The sender and the eavesdropper are considered as the two players of the game.Data is transmitted by senders with probability,determining the data transmission to effective tap is hence difficult for the eavesdroppers.With the tool of PRISM,simulation results demonstrate that there is a Nash Equilibrium point in MGBR,where the probability to be eavesdropped can be minimized.Furthermore,we presented the probability variation tendency of information to be eavesdropped on the Nash Equilibrium point.Compared with protocol based on minimal-hop algorithm,MGBR can reduce the probability of information to be eavesdropped effectively.

关 键 词：无线传感器网络 马尔可夫博弈路由模型 概率 

分 类 号：TP393.08[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]