基于汉明重的PRESENT密码代数旁路攻击  

Hamming Weight-based Algebraic Side-channel Attack against PRESENT

作　　者：吴克辉[1] 王韬[1] 赵新杰[1] 刘会英[1] 

机构地区：[1]军械工程学院计算机工程系,石家庄050003

出　　处：《计算机科学》2011年第12期53-56,共4页Computer Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(60772082);河北省自然科学基金(08M010)资助

摘　　要：研究了分组密码代数旁路攻击原理及模型、非线性布尔方程组转化为SAT问题的方法,提出了一种基于汉明重的PRESENT密码代数旁路攻击方法,降低了求解非线性多元方程组的复杂度,减少了旁路攻击所需样本量,并通过实验对理论正确性进行了验证。结果表明,在已知明文条件下,利用一个样本前3轮的S盒输入、输出汉明重在0.63s内即可恢复80bit PRESENT完整密钥;在未知明密文和S盒输入、输出汉明重随机选取条件下,也可恢复PRESENT完整密钥。This paper examined the theory and model of algebraic side-channel attack against block ciphers,the method of converting non-linear boolean equation system to SAT problem, proposed a method of Hamming weight based alge- braic side-channel cryptanalysis against PRESENT, reduced the complexity of solving non-linear boolean equation sys- tem and the sample size of side-channel attack, finally testified the validity of theory through experiments. Results show that if knowing one sample of plaintext, it can recover 80 bit keys of PRESENT with Hamming weights of S-box inputs and outputs of front 10 round in 0. 63 seconds; if plaintext and cipher are unknow or the used Hamming weights of S- box input are random, it can also make a success of recovering complete PRESENT key.

关 键 词：代数旁路攻击 代数攻击 旁路攻击 汉明重 PRESENT 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]