市场竞争强度、管理层持股与公司绩效——基于内生性视角的经验证据  

Market Competition Intensity,Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance——Empirical Evidences from Perspective of Endogeneity

作　　者：程柯[1] 程立[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093 [2]上海第二工业大学经济管理学院,上海201209

出　　处：《产业经济研究》2011年第5期53-61,共9页Industrial Economics Research

基　　金：南京大学国际化会计学博士生项目(IAPHD)

摘　　要：本文选取2007～2009年679家中国非金融类上市公司组成的平衡面板数据集,运用超产权理论,引入市场竞争强度,从内生性视角实证检验了管理层持股与公司绩效之间的关系。结果发现,在控制内生性影响后,管理层持股与公司绩效之间存在倒U型激励效应和市场竞争调节效应,后者具体体现为,当竞争强度增加时,利益协同效应增强;当垄断程度增强时,壕沟效应加剧。本文的经验发现有助于认知股权激励的机制安排和政府监管的政策取向。This paper investigates the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance by considering the endogenous nature of the ownership variable. We make theoretical analysis by introducing the vector of market competition intensity based on beyond property-right argument framework. Using a balanced panel data set comprised of 679 Chinese non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2009, we conduct our empirical analysis by applying simultaneous equations models. The main evidences indicated that when managerial ownership is treated as endogenous, there are an inverted U-shape incentive effect and a market-competition-intensity-moderating effect of managerial ownership on corporate performance. The specific way of the moderating effect lies in, when the market competition intensity increases, the convergence effect of managerial ownership enhances ; when the degree of monopoly increases, the entrenchment effect of managerial ownership aggravates. The empirical findings contribute to understanding the mechanism arrangements of ownership incentives and policy orientations of government regulation

关 键 词：市场竞争强度 管理层持股 公司绩效 超产权理论 内生性 股权激励 

分 类 号：F260[经济管理—国民经济]