公司治理对我国商业银行风险影响的实证研究  

An Empirical Study of the Influence of Corporate Governance upon the Risk of Commercial Bank of China

作　　者：王晓枫[1] 吴丛根[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学金融学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《长沙理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第6期73-79,共7页Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology：Social Science

基　　金：国家教育部社科基金项目(项目编号:11YJA790154)

摘　　要：运用我国14家上市银行2001年-2010年的年度数据,将我国上市银行分为股份制银行、国有银行和城市商业银行三类,将银行风险分为信用风险、流动性风险和市场风险,建立面板模型,利用Eviews 6软件实证分析了公司治理对我国上市银行风险的影响。实证结果表明:高管薪酬与三类银行信用风险,市场风险和流动性风险均呈负相关的关系,表明高管薪酬越高,银行风险越小;对股份制银行和城市商业银行来说,股权集中度与银行信用风险负相关,表明股权集中度越高,信用风险越小;对于国有银行来说,股权集中度与银行风险正相关,表明股权集中度越高,银行风险越高;董事会规模与银行风险承担的分析,也出现的相同的情况,对于股份制银行来说,董事会规模与市场风险负相关,表明董事会规模越大,市场风险越小;对于国有银行来说,董事会规模与市场风险正相关,表明董事会规模越大,市场风险越大;对于城市商业银行来说,董事会规模与市场风险的关系并不显著。On the basis of annual data of 14 Chinese marketing banks from 2001 to 2010,this article divides China＇s operating banks into three categories,namely banks with share holding systems,state-owned banks and municipal commercial banks,while the banking risk into credit risk,liquidity risk and market risk.Aiming to establish panel model,it avails of the Eview 6 software to offer an empirical analysis of the influence of company governance upon the risk of China＇s marketing banks.The result shows that the executive pay presents a negative correlation with banking credit risk,marketing risk and liquidity risk;and that the higher the executive pay the less the banking risk;and that,for shareholding banks and municipal commercial banks,the concentration ratio of stock rights presents a negative correlation to banking credit risk,so the higher the concentration ratio,the less the credit risk;and that for the state-owned banks,the concentration ratio of stock rights presents a positive relation to banking risk,so the higher the concentration ratio the higher the banking risk;and that it is the same case with analysis of scope of board of directors and the risk-taking of the banks,so for the share-holding banks,the scope of the board of directors is negatively related to marketing risk,then the bigger board of directors,the less the marketing risk;and that for the state-owned banks,the scope of board of directors is positively related to marketing risk,so the bigger the board and greater the risk;and that for the municipal commercial banks,the relationship between the scope of the board of directors and the marketing risk is not clearly revealed.

关 键 词：公司治理 风险承担 上市银行 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]