城市基础设施PPP项目内部契约治理的柔性激励机制探析  

Internal contract governance incentives and flexible incentive mechanism in urban infrastructure PPP projects

作　　者：石莎莎[1] 杨明亮[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083 [2]中南大学审计处,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第6期155-160,共6页Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences

基　　金：教育部财务研究课题([2010]328号)

摘　　要：随着城市基础设施PPP项目逐渐在我国掀起第二轮"热潮"并不断曝光存在的问题,如何缔结有效的内部契约关系以完善项目治理机制构成了PPP项目运营决策的重要课题,并显现出巨大的理论价值和实践意义。基于系统动力理论提出了内部契约治理机制产生的内外诱因,并深入分析了其诱导原理;针对利益冲突和风险环境两大诱因,结合项目治理理论和激励理论,提出以柔性激励机制作为PPP项目内部契约治理机制的指导思想,并深入探讨其治理作用机理,以期对PPP项目在我国城市基础设施领域的演进和发展提供理论指导和借鉴。There is a new wave of public-private partnership（PPP） project of Chinese urban infrastructure,and also there are many problems of PPP projects.How to establish a sound contractual relations to improve internal governance mechanisms has become an important problem confronting PPP projects,and it reveals the great theoretical and practical significance.This thesis studies incentives of internal contract governance by using system dynamic theory,and a thorough analysis of inducing principle is given.This thesis,starting from the two incentives？？-interest conflict and risk environment,proposes flexible incentive mechanism as the guiding idea for internal contract governance of PPP projects based on project governance theory and incentive theory,and studies its＇ governance principle in depth,so as to offer theoretical guidance for the developing of urban infrastructure PPP projects in China.

关 键 词：城市基础设施 PPP项目 契约治理机制 内部诱因 外部诱因 柔性激励机制 

分 类 号：F294.1[经济管理—国民经济]