农村非正规金融存续与发展的博弈分析——基于金融生态主体发展失衡的视角  

Game Theory Analysis of the Existence and Development of Rural Informal Finance——from the Perspective of Rural Financial Ecology Uneven Development

作　　者：乔立娟[1] 赵桂玲[2] 王文青[1] 杜英娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北农业大学经济贸易学院,河北保定071001 [2]河北金融学院,河北保定071051

出　　处：《中国农学通报》2011年第29期199-203,共5页Chinese Agricultural Science Bulletin

基　　金：2010年度河北省社会科学发展研究课题"统筹城乡发展视角下河北省农村金融生态评价与优化路径研究"(201004038);河北省科技厅2010年度河北省科技计划项目"河北省农村社会养老保险问题及对策研究"(10457204D-10);2010年度保定市社会科学发展研究项目"保定市农业产业化进程中农业保险的需求研究"(201002048)

摘　　要：从中国农村金融生态主体非均衡发展的视角构建分析框架,为优化农村金融生态主体行为提供理论借鉴。通过不完全信息动态博弈法对农村金融生态主体行为进行分析,并寻找地方政府、非正规金融机构以及各类借款人的最优均衡。指出地方政府在农村非正规金融的形成与发展中的重要作用。而由于博弈次数与惩罚力度的不同,农村借款人的策略选择也影响到农村非正规金融业务的开展。最后,对农村金融生态主体的选择进行分析,并提出合理的对策建议。Under the viewing angle of the entities of rural financial ecology uneven development,the paper constructed analytical framework,and offered reference on optimization the behavior of the entities of rural financial ecology.Using the dynamic game theory with imperfect information,the entities behavior of rural financial ecology was analyzed,and the optimal equilibrium between the local government,informal finance and types of borrowers were found.The important role of local government in the formation and development of rural informal finance was point out.Because of the difference of the game times and punishment for dishonesty,the strategy selection of the rural borrowers also affect the development of rural informal finance.At last,the strategy selection of the entities of rural financial ecology was analyzed,and reasonable countermeasures were offered.

关 键 词：金融生态 正规金融 非正规金融 地方政府 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]