基于博弈论的省际水事纠纷预防机制研究  

Prevention Mechanism for Interprovincial Water Conflict Based on Game Theory

作　　者：李浩[1] 黄薇[1] 梁佩瑾[1] 

机构地区：[1]长江科学院水资源综合利用研究所,武汉430010

出　　处：《长江科学院院报》2011年第12期72-76,共5页Journal of Changjiang River Scientific Research Institute

基　　金：长江科学院博士启动费项目(CKSQ2010076);中央级公益性科研院所基金项目(CKSF201004)

摘　　要：省际水事纠纷具有易发生、难调解的特点,以预防为主的纠纷协调方式能减少事后调解的危害和难度。尽管省际水事纠纷表现形式各异,但其本质是参与人之间利益关系的博弈过程。运用博弈理论提出了省际水事纠纷的演化发展分析框架,并结合鄂豫丹江荆紫关水事纠纷案例,具体分析中央与地方在修建水利工程避免水事纠纷方面的博弈演化过程。最后从信息收集、信息处理与分析、信息评估与预测、信息沟通及干预机制等方面提出了省际水事纠纷预防机制框架。为省际水事纠绘的调处提供了依据。Interprovincial water conflict,by nature,is a gaming process around benefit among all parties despite its various tokens.Game theory is employed to analyze the evolution of interprovincial water conflicts,in particular,the evolutionary gaming process of addressing water conflict between the central government and local government by constructing water conservancy projects.The water conflict at Jingziguan County which locates at the shared border of Hubei,Henan and Shaanxi Provinces by the Danjiang River is taken as a case study.An effective prevention framework comprising mechanisms of information collection,information processing and analyzing,information evaluation and prediction,as well as communication and intervention is put forward.The prevention mechanism will diminish damage and improve efficiency rather than to mediate afterwards.

关 键 词：博弈论 省际 水事纠纷 预防机制 

分 类 号：TV213.4[水利工程—水文学及水资源]