IPO模式与效率的博弈分析  

Game analysis on IPO modes and efficiency

作　　者：黄秀海[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经学院数学与统计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《科研管理》2011年第12期68-73,共6页Science Research Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目<基于影子价格非线性推断视角的股市泡沫计量及风险监管机制研究>;项目编号:08JA790118;起止时间:2009.1-2011.12)

摘　　要：IPO效率一直是学术界研究的热点问题,但没有IPO模式与效率关系的专门研究。文献资料显示I,PO本质是一种制度的安排,是一种博弈现象。通过分析IPO模式演化历程的特点,结合我国股市情况,提出基于IPO模式中散户数量与效率对应关系展开博弈研究的新思路,根据参与约束、激励约束的条件,建立理论模型,展开博弈分析。结果发现:完全排除散户的IPO模式效率最差;散户完全参与的IPO模式具有pareto最佳效率;散户有限参与的IPO模式效率介于这两者之间。依据博弈分析结论,为从体制上保障IPO模式的效率,提出消除承销商等中间环节,建立上市公司与投资者直接沟通的市场化机制构想。IPO＇s efficiency is a hot research spot,however,there is no special research on the relation between IPO modes and its efficiency.Existing literature shows IPO that in essence is a kind of systematic arrangement and game phenomenon.A new research method based on the relationship between the number of retail investors involving IPO modes and its efficiency from its evolving course is proposed.The game models constructed based on incentive compatibility and individual rationality disclose that IPO modes fully ruling out retail investors have little efficiency,the modes with the completely participation of retail inrestors possess Pareto optimal efficiency,and the modes having limited participation of retail investirs have the efficiency between these tow efficiencies.Finally,the suggestion that decrease unnecessary middle links and build a directly interactiv market mechanism between listed-company and investors are put forward.

关 键 词：IPO模式 资源配置效率 机制设计 激励约束 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]