基于演化博弈的钢铁企业环境污染问题研究  

Research on Problems of Environmental Pollution of Iron and Steel Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：姚江芬[1] 张晓玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院,秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《价值工程》2012年第2期319-320,共2页Value Engineering

摘　　要：本文应用演化博弈理论,从钢铁企业和环保部门都只存在有限理性的角度出发,研究两者之间相互作用的策略选择行为,结果表明:长期而言,两个博弈方的策略选择取决于他们所处的初始状态的影响。The paper studies strategic choice behavior of the interaction between iron and steel enterprises and environmental protection department from the perspective of existing in bounded rationality of both, by using Evolutionary Game Theory. The results show that two game parties＇ strategic choices are determined by the influence of their initial state.

关 键 词：环境污染 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：TF089[冶金工程—冶金物理化学]