模糊环境下不对称企业的技术创新投资期权博弈分析  

Option-Game Approach to Analyze Technology Innovation Investment With Cost Asymmetry Under the Fuzzy Environment

作　　者：谭英双[1] 衡爱民[2] 龙勇[1] 吴宏伟[1] 江礼梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]四川外语学院国际商学院,重庆40031

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2011年第6期163-168,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：教育部高层次人才支持计划基金资助(NCET-07-0906);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672012;11001289)

摘　　要：本文在不对称双头垄断期权博弈模型基础上讨论了利润流现值和沉没投资成本为梯形模糊数的情形并进行了扩展,对企业技术创新投资策略进行了分析。构建了模糊环境下追随者、领导者的投资价值和投资临界值的模糊表达式并进行数值分析。分析表明模糊环境下仍存在最优投资策略,随着梯形模糊数的沉没投资成本期望值的增加,企业的投资价值下降而投资临界值上升。为模糊环境下投资决策提供了一种解释。Basing on the asymmetric duopoly option-game model with investment cost asymmetry, this research discusses the present value of profit flows and the sunk investment costs for the trapezoidal fuzzy number, and Firms＇ technology innovation investment strategy is analyzed. It constructs followers, leaders of investment value and investment threshold of fuzzy expressions under the fuzzy environment to conduct numerical analysis. And it is concluded that there is still existing the best increasing investment strategy under fuzzy environment, with the development of the trapezoidal fuzzy number of the sunk cost of expected investment, the investment value of business declines, but the critical value for the investment ascends. This offers a kind of explanation to the investment strategies under the fuzzy environment.

关 键 词：期权博弈 梯形模糊数 技术创新 双头垄断 

分 类 号：F406.3[经济管理—产业经济]