网上集中采购的捆绑-组合拍卖机制设计  

Mechanism design of hybrid bundling and combination auction for centralized E-procurement

作　　者：汪定伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学系统工程研究所,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2011年第6期809-816,共8页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70931001);国家自然科学基金创新群体资助项目(60821063);教育部博士点基金资助项目(200801450008)

摘　　要：政府与大型企业集团的集中采购通常采用网上逆向组合拍卖的方式进行.在分析计算组合拍卖可行解数量与竞价人数关系的基础上,指出当符合资质要求的竞价人数量不足时,难以形成有效的价格竞争.提出了一种捆绑与组合结合的两轮逆向拍卖机制.首先根据第一轮组合拍卖的报价结果,计算不同捆绑方案的价格互补性指标和组合一致性指标.其次按极大化上述两个指标的多目标模型确定最优的捆绑方案.然后将捆绑后的标的物进行第二轮拍卖.数值计算的结果显示,上述方法能够激化竞价者在投标中的竞争,从而使拍卖人获得更好的经济效益.The reverse combinatorial auctions are usually applied to the centralized E-procurements of gov- ernments and large enterprise groups. Based on the analysis and computation of the relationship of feasible solution number and bidder number, the paper points out that the competition may be not efficient in the case of there are no enough quantified bidders. A new auction mechanism of two-round reverse auction with hybrid bundling and combination is proposed in this paper. According to the bidding results of first round combi- natorial auction, it calculates the two criteria on both price complementation and combination consistency of different bundling schemes. The optimal bundling scheme is achieved with a multi-objective optimization model. Then, the bundled objects are auctioned in the second round. The numerical examples show that above auction mechanism can enhance the bidding competition and bring the satisfactory profits to auctioneers.

关 键 词：网上集中采购 逆向拍卖 组合拍卖 标的物捆绑 拍卖机制设计 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]