建设项目跨组织创新应用合作的动态演化分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Cooperative Implementation of Inter-organizational Innovation in the Construction Project

作　　者：王广斌[1] 曹冬平[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092 [2]曼彻斯特大学项目管理研究中心

出　　处：《软科学》2011年第12期7-12,共6页Soft Science

基　　金：上海市科委科技攻关项目(10dz1202600)

摘　　要：针对建设项目特殊性三角结构关系,应用演化博弈理论对其跨组织创新应用合作的演化稳定策略进行了分析。以有限理性为假设前提,构建了施工方及设计方进行创新应用合作的复制动态模型,分析了合作协同系数、收益溢出系数、合作收益大小及其分配机制、合作成本大小及其分配机制等因素对双方演化稳定策略的影响;探讨了业主方补贴情形下设计方及施工方进行创新应用合作的策略选择及其稳定性,分析了业主方补贴策略的有效性及局限性。Considering the special triangular relationship structure in the construction project, this paper uses the evolutionary game theory to analyze the evolutionarily stable strategies （ESS） for the cooperative implementation of inter-or- ganizational innovation in a project. Based on the assumption of participants＇ bounded rationality, this paper firstly con- structs a replicator dynamics model for the contractor and designer＇ s cooperation of inter-organizational innovation implementation and analyzes the influences of cooperation coordination coefficient, benefit spillover coefficient, cooperation benefit value, benefit allocation coefficient, cooperation cost value and cost allocation coefficient on the evolution and stability of participants＇ strategies. Then it discusses how the project owner could use the subsidy policy to influence the contractor and designer＇ s evolutionarily stable strategies for their cooperative implementation of inter-organizational innovation, and especially analyzes the validity and limitation of the subsidy policy.

关 键 词：建设项目 跨组织创新 合作 业主方补贴 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济] F062.4