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机构地区:[1]华北电力大学经济与管理学院,北京102206
出 处:《科技和产业》2011年第12期100-104,共5页Science Technology and Industry
摘 要:针对现实经济中企业创新技术获取问题,首先运用包括创新及产出阶段的博弈模型分析了合作创新模式;然后构建了包括创新、许可及产出阶段的博弈模型,并根据此模型重点分析了技术许可模式;最后通过比较分析得出企业最优的技术获取策略。研究表明:当创新为非显著水平且产品差异较小时,技术许可模式下通过两部制策略许可将是最优的;当创新为显著水平或产品差异较大时,合作创新模式下的合资企业或卡特尔是最优的。In order to analyze innovative technology acquisition model in the real economy,this paper firstly applies the game model to analyze the technology acquisition pattern of independent or cooperative innovation;And then it constructs a three-stage game model of duopoly and uses this model to analyze the technology acquisition pattern of combining technology innovation with technology licensing;Finally we comparatively analyze the game results under the two models,in this way,we can obtain the optimal strategy of RD for the innovative firms in the duopoly market structure.It is showed that: when innovation is in a non-significant level and the product has the less differentiation,technical innovation combining two of licensing strategy is the optimal technology acquisition strategy;under a significant innovation level and a large difference between the products,joint venture enterprise or Cartel innovation is optimal.
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