排污权交易机制与社会福利  

Study on the Emission Trading Mechanism and Social Welfare

作　　者：马云泽[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071

出　　处：《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第1期66-71,共6页Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家哲学社会科学青年基金资助项目(09CJY042);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关基金资助项目(09JZD0018)

摘　　要：构建了单个排污行业以总量控制为核心的排污权交易机制模型以及政府与企业之间的博弈模型,以考察排污权交易机制在环境治理方面所带来的社会福利影响。建立低成本的完善的排污监管机制是建立有效排污权交易机制的关键条件,政府部门可以通过降低监管成本,提高治污能力以及提供相应的减排激励或者提供相应的产品技术研发资金来有效地提高治污效率,提高社会福利,而企业同样具有相应的激励来改进生产技术,减少污染物产生量和直接排放量来增加企业福利。This paper presents an emission trading model based on an emission industry and a game tree between government and emission industry. With the model we will do some research about the change of social welfare that emission trading mechanism brings about. We find that if we want to build efficient emission trading mechanism, we must build ef- fective supervisory mechanism first. To increase the social welfare, the government can reduce the supervisory cost, im- prove the ability to control pollution, and provide some motivation or some funds for R＆D. Then we can increase the effi- ciency to manage pollution and we can increase our social welfare. Simultaneously, the industry has motivation to improve production technology, reduce the output of pollution and the pollutants discharged directly. So the social cost will increase.

关 键 词：排污权交易机制 总量控制 监管机制 社会福利 

分 类 号：C913.7[经济管理]