风险投资基金运作效率比较研究——基于报酬激励机制的视角  

Research on Operational Efficiency of Venture Capital Found——Perspective of Compensation Incentive Mechanism

作　　者：李云飞[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西华师范大学数学与信息学院,四川南充637009 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《西华师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第4期331-335,共5页Journal of China West Normal University(Natural Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971015);西华师范大学校基金资助项目(10A014)

摘　　要：公司制和有限合伙制是现代风险投资基金采用的两种最主要的组织形式.从风险投资者角度出发,基于报酬激励机制视角,建立模型对这两种基金的运作效率进行了比较分析.理论研究结果表明,在有限合伙制风险投资基金运作模式下,风险投资家付出的最优努力程度要大于在公司制风险投资基金中风险投资家付出的最优努力努力程度;有限合伙制下的风险投资者所获得的期望收入要大于公司制下的风险投资者所获得的期望收入.因此,从报酬激励机制角度来看,有效合伙制风险投资基金的运作效率要高于公司制风险投资基金的运作效率.The main mechanisms taken by modern venture capital found are the institution of company and institution of limited partnership. From the perspective of venture investor, two models are set up to research on operational efficiency of the two forms of venture capital found based on the perspective of compensation incentive mechanism. The theoretical researches show that the degree of endeavor of venture capitalist in the institution of limited partnership is higher than that in the institution of company; the expected income of venture investor in the institution of limited partnership is higher than that in the institution of company. Therefore, the institution of limited partnership is better than the institution of company in venture capital found.

关 键 词：风险投资 公司制 有限合伙制 报酬激励机制 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]