农地征用中的利益博弈与立法选择  

Interest Competition and Legislation Option in Farmland Acquisition

作　　者：邹卫中[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央民族大学管理学院,北京100081

出　　处：《攀登（哲学社会科学版）》2011年第6期102-106,共5页New Heights(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：中央民族大学管理学院985工程三期建设研究生探索性科研计划项目(YTS09)成果

摘　　要：当前农地征用中失地农民与地方政府之间存在明显的利益分歧,利益博弈各方时常处于零和的状态。某些土地制度规定的相对滞后和地方政府行为的错位及"官本位"格局下强政府——弱农民的力量对比态势,成为利益零和博弈的根本原因。明晰农地产权主体,重构农地产权制度,创建一个有效而公平的谈判协商机制,创建农民组织,规范政府行为,这些都是立法选择方面的主要构想。Currently,there are obvious interest disparity between lost land farmers and local government in the farmland acquisition,and the all sides of interest competition are in a status of zero harmony.The basic cause of it is that some land systematic regulations relatively backward and local governmental administration being in dislocation,and the strength of powerful government and feeble farmers under the phase of ＂official position＂ being in comparison.Clarifying the main body of farmland property rights,rebuild statutes of it,and reconstruct an efficient and fare negotiation mechanism,farmer organizations,and standardize governmental behavior,all these are main ideas of legislation option.

关 键 词：农地征用 利益博弈 博弈均衡 立法选择 

分 类 号：D923.3[政治法律—民商法学]