地方物流供应商“偷懒”行为监管机制研究  

Study on Regulatory Mechanism of the Civilian Logistics Suppliers' Goldbricking Behavior

作　　者：姚平[1] 姜大立[1] 李德[1] 

机构地区：[1]后勤工程学院后勤信息工程系,重庆401311

出　　处：《后勤工程学院学报》2012年第1期71-75,共5页Journal of Logistical Engineering University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871119/G0109);国家社会科学基金资助项目(09CJY012)

摘　　要：军民融合现代军事物流体系中,地方物流供应商往往会"偷懒",这必将损害军民融合现代军事物流体系的整体绩效。首先描述了"偷懒"行为及其危害性,从机制入手,基于博弈论建立地方物流供应商"偷懒"行为监管机制;分析并证明了监管机制的有效性。这一机制的构建对于监管地方物流供应商具有重要作用。In integrated military-civilian modern military logistics system, the civilian logistics suppliers often goldbrick ,which will inevitably undermine the overall performance of the system. Therefore, the research describes the civilian logistics suppliers＇ goldbricking behavior and its harm, then builds the regulatory mechanism to control the civilian logistics Suppliers＇ goldbricking behavior based on game theory, and proves the effectiveness of the regulatory mechanism. This regulatory mechanism plays an important role to regulate the behavior of civilian logistics suppliers.

关 键 词：监管机制 供应商 “偷懒”行为 博弈论 

分 类 号：F062.3[经济管理—政治经济学]