上市公司大股东与管理者合谋的防范对策  

Countermeasures of Collusion Between Major Shareholders and Company Managers

作　　者：严也舟[1] 李竟婧[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉工程大学管理学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《郑州航空工业管理学院学报》2012年第1期55-58,共4页Journal of Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics

基　　金：湖北省人文社会科学基金资助项目(2009q049);武汉工程大学科学研究基金资助项目(1711851)

摘　　要：上市公司控股大股东与管理者合谋侵占中小股东利益是导致我国上市公司整体绩效偏差、股市低迷的一个非常重要的原因。主要从改善法治化水平、政府干预程度等外部治理环境的角度入手,分析了防范大股东与管理者合谋侵占中小股东利益的对策。Collusion between controlling shareholders and managers of listed companies is a very important reason that leads to the poor performance of Chinese listed companies and stock market downturn. This study suggests that in order to suppress the controlling shareholders of listed companies collude with managers to reduce agency costs, firstly we should improve the legislative level through perfecting information disclosure sys- tem of listed companies, improving the securities civil compensation system, and strengthening enforcement of law. Secondly the government should decisively reduce the holdings of state - owned shares of listed companies and change the way intervention in the economy, so as to reduce direct administrative intervention in the economy.

关 键 词：上市公司 大股东与管理者合谋侵占 公司治理 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]