激励中测评行为对绩效的影响研究  

THE EFFECTS OF MANAGER'S MEASUREMENT ON AGENT'S PERFORMANCE

作　　者：龚其国[1] 杨羽茹[1] 汪寿阳[2] 

机构地区：[1]中科院研究生院管理学院,北京100080 [2]中科院数学与系统科学研究院,北京100190

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2011年第10期1288-1296,共9页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点基金(70731003)资助课题

摘　　要：绩效评估一直是激励设计的核心问题,直接决定激励的强度与有效性.绩效评估是否有效取决于评估指标与真实产出的一致性或扭曲程度,对企业有价值的绩效指标能够尽可能反映被评估行为的最大价值.在"多任务"代理理论的框架下,将测评指标内生为管理者的行为,构造了三级激励结构,讨论了管理者测评行为的努力对激励强度、被测行为等的影响.该激励模型可用于供应链上的激励机制分析.Performance measurement is an essential part of the design of any incentive system. The strength and value of incentive in firms are strongly affected by the performance measures available. Whether performance measures are valuable depends on their distortion to output and valuable performance measures should be in great consistency with the maximum value of actions. In this paper, we use a multi-task model to develop a three-party characterization of incentive and show how the efforts exerted by manager to improve performance measurement affect the strengths of incentive and optimal choices. This model is also applied to supply chain incentive.

关 键 词：代理理论 激励扭曲 激励强度 最优行动 测评行为. 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F272