承运人联盟合作博弈机制设计  

Cooperative Game Based Mechanisms Design in Carrier Alliance

作　　者：王文杰[1] 陈峰[1,2] 江志斌[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学中美物流研究院,上海200240 [2]上海交通大学工业工程与物流工程系,上海200240

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2011年第12期1778-1781,共4页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大国际(地区)合作研究项目(70831160527);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771063)

摘　　要：承运人联盟中,各成员追求各自收益最大化,成员与联盟的最优决策往往是不一致的,因而导致联盟不稳定.承运人面对产生的需求有2种选择:接受或拒绝.考虑该约束条件,在一个由承运人联盟运营的航运物流网络的基础上,以合作博弈理论和数学规划为框架建立了承运人联盟的合作博弈模型,并设计了运力互租价格为核心的收益分摊机制,该机制为联盟成员提供了补偿性支付.分别对联盟和成员的决策过程进行数学建模,运用逆优化技术使得两者的最优决策一致,进而实现了联盟和合作的可持续性.After carriers forming an alliance,because each carrier operates according to its own profits,the benefit of each member is usually not in line with the whole alliance＇s,which leads to the instability of alliance.Carriers have two choices when facing emerging customer needs： refuse or accept.Combined the constraints,and based on the establishment of shipping logistics network operated by a carrier alliance,cooperative game theory and mathematical programming method are utilized to establish the cooperative model of carrier alliance.And effective allocation mechanism is designed to provide side payment to each member.The decision process of alliance and individual member is modeled respectively,and inverse optimization technique is utilized to make the optimal decision of individual member accord with the whole alliance＇s.In this way,the sustainability of alliance and collaboration is realized.

关 键 词：合作博弈 承运人联盟 机制设计 逆优化 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]