国家自主性、中央银行独立性与国际货币合作——德国国际货币政策选择的政治逻辑  

State Autonomy,Central Bank Independence and International Monetary Cooperation:The Political Logic of Germany's Choice in International Monetary Policy

作　　者：田野[1] 张晓波[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学国际关系学院 [2]中国人民大学苏州研究院

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2012年第1期93-111,158-159,共19页World Economics and Politics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"参与国际合作机制和维护国家自主性的关系研究"(批准号:08CGJ001)的资助

摘　　要：政治经济学文献表明,通过将货币政策交给具有独立性的中央银行来管理,政府可以增强货币政策承诺的可信性。但是,具有独立性的中央银行在政治过程中也构成了一个否决行为体,从而有可能限制国家(政府)的自主性。根据"结构导致的均衡"的分析视角,如果国家偏好与中央银行偏好不一致,何者可以转化为权威性行为将取决于该国的政治制度。在国内政治制度的变革难以实现的情况下,国家可以通过参与国际制度与国际谈判来改变中央银行与政府之间的既有均衡,并使这种均衡朝着增强国家自主性的方向演变。作为世界上独立程度最高的中央银行之一,德国联邦银行担心欧洲货币合作会干扰其维护国内币值稳定的目标,更不愿通过放弃本国货币马克来推进货币一体化。但是,德国联邦政府通过其在国际制度与国际谈判中享有的信息优势与合法性,克服了德国联邦银行对欧洲货币合作的反对,推动建立了欧洲货币体系和欧洲货币联盟。The literature of political economy shows that government can enhance the credibility of monetary policy commitments by delegating an independent central bank to regulate it.But in political process,an independent central bank can also act as a veto-player which will restrict the autonomy of state (government).From the perspective of 'structure-induced equilibria',if there is inconformity between state preference and central bank preferences,the political institution can decide which one will be converted to the authoritative behavior.Usually the institution of domestic politics can be hardly changed,and a state can alter the existing equilibria between central bank and government by participating in international institutions and negotiations,which will move towards enhancing the state autonomy.As one of the highest independent central banks,the Bundesbank feared that the European monetary cooperation would make it difficult to achieve its aim for domestic currency stability and therefore was reluctant to accept currency integration at the expense of Mark.However,German federal government has overcome the objections from Bundesbank and promoted the establishment of European Monetary System and European Monetary Union by using its informational advantages and legitimacy in the international institutions and negotiations.

关 键 词：国家自主性 中央银行独立性 国际货币合作 德国 

分 类 号：D751.6[政治法律—政治学] F835.16[政治法律—中外政治制度]