我国上市公司终极股东的剥夺机理研究:基于“股权控制链”与“社会资本控制链”的比较  

Study on the Depriving System of the Ultimate Shareholders of Listed Companies in China:A Comparative Analysis between the Equity Control Chain and Social Capital Control Chain

作　　者：关鑫[1] 高闯[2] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院 [2]首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2011年第6期16-24,共9页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072072);中国博士后科学基金项目(20110490026)资助

摘　　要：随着第二类公司治理问题成为理论研究的新焦点,上市公司终极股东的剥夺行为越发引起了学者们的高度关注。在"双重控制链"分析范式下,终极股东控制权与其现金流权之间的偏离加大,导致控制权私利增大,这种被"修正"后的控制权私利,即被"社会资本控制链"分析范式下的控制权溢价放大的"股权控制链"分析范式下的控制权私利,才是终极股东对上市公司进行剥夺的根本动因。沿着这一分析思路,文章分别对终极股东利益输送渠道的选择、剥夺行为的逻辑起点、"隧道挖掘"行为以及"二次剥夺"等问题进行剖析和深刻解读,并特别提出了显性剥夺和隐性剥夺两种剥夺形式,从而更加全面清晰地认识终极股东的剥夺机理。The second kind of corporate governance issues called the controlling and depriving of ultimate shareholder which caused by the Asian financial crisis, has become the new focus of academic empirical research. Many scholars have studied on the controlling structure of listed companies worldwide, certificated the existence of the ultimate shareholders all over the world, and led the research in that field. Looking at the world, the deprivation （sometimes it is called ＂tunneling＂ behaviors） of ultimate shareholders are also widely exist in the practices of modem corporate governance. This phenomenon exists not only in developing countries stock market, but also in the developed stock markets of Europe and the U.S.A. Even in the capital markets that have most stringent regulation, better disclosure of market information, there also existed a small number of interest groups who used tunneling behaviors to damage the small investors＇ interests. Tunneling phenomenon of ultimate shareholders in China＇s listed companies is particularly prominent. Numerous empirical studies have shown that the ultimate shareholders of listed companies in China have deprived the minority shareholders are much more common than that of the U.S.A and UK. The same is true in other countries; China＇s family controlling shareholders deprive the interests of small shareholders also by the separation of cash flow rights and voting rights. Thus, more and more scholars have paid attention to the depriving issue of the ultimate shareholders, and the researches on this issue have high theoretical value and practical significance. In previous studies, scholars mostly focus on the depriving motivation, tunneling behaviors and the economic consequences in the ＂equity control chains＂ analysis paradigm. However, we noted that it was difficult to reveal the true mechanism of control and deprive only with the ultimate shareholders＇ equity control chain, they creatively, put forward a social capital control chains which was complementary wi

关 键 词：终极股东 社会资本 控制权私利 隧道挖掘 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]