灾害风险、福利损失与政府最优救助计划  

Disaster Risks,Welfare Costs and the Optimal Disaster Relief Policy of Government

作　　者：田玲[1] 高俊[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072 [2]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《经济管理》2012年第1期173-181,共9页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究重大项关项目"巨灾风险管理制度创新研究"(09JZD0028);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"中国巨灾保险供给能力研究"(09YJA790149);国家社会科学基金重大项目"我国巨灾保险制度安排与实施路径研究"(11&ZD053)

摘　　要：本文在考虑灾害风险冲击的基础上,通过构建消费者—政府随机决策模型、权衡福利与财政的得失和理论推演,得到政府最优救灾规模的多维边界。具体救助规模由刻画灾害风险福利损失的各参数内生决定。具体而言,灾害损失程度是导致灾害救助需求加重的直接原因;而消费者的风险厌恶程度则会进一步扩大人们对灾害救助的需求;资本的留存情况和形成效率可减轻政府救灾的压力;灾害发生频率虽不影响最优救助规模,但会对整个社会福利产生消极影响。据此,加强灾前防御、普及灾害科普知识以及提高灾害资金运作效率,可达到减轻救助支出负担、提升灾害救助效果、增进社会的福利水平的目的。本文展示了如何设计灾害救助的最优规模,以与实际的社会环境和经济环境动态挂钩。To study the optimal relief behavior of the government, we introduce a dynamic stochastic control model which considers the catastrophe risk, consumers＇ risk preference, budget constraint, and the government＇s fiscal costs. The model shows that the optimal relief behavior of the government is a trade-off between the benefit of the consumers＇ welfare and the government＇ s fiscal costs. And it exits multidimensional optimal frontiers of the government behavior. That is to say, the optimal subsidy scales are different if the change occurs among the param-eters, even if they are the uniform catastrophe. Consequently, there are conclusions following： Firstly, the larger of the loss the catastrophe cause, the worse of the anti-disaster ability consumers＇ have. It would lead to larger optimal subsidy scale, and the government financial burden is heavier. Secondly, the more consumers disguise risk, the more carefully they make the decision. And it would bring about more compensation required for the catastrophe loss. Hence the scale of the optimal relief policy would be larger. It is to pay more money for the government. Thirdly, if the production of our economy is more effective, the optimal relief scale would be less, and the money which the government pays for the catastrophe would be less too. Finally, the appropriate relief （optimal relief） scale help to improve the level of social welfare. Following the increasing risk aversion, the effects of the govern-ment relief to the catastrophe are better.According to our conclusion, to reduce expenditure, heighten the relief effects, improve the whole social welfare, we make some recommendations, such as strengthening the Riskbearing capacity, improving production efficiency, as well as reducing the catastrophe loss. And we see that the government should take three measures to re-live their catastrophe assistance pressure. First of all, the government should encourage people transfer the stress of risk management from post-quake to pre-disasters so as to min

关 键 词：灾害风险 福利损失 最优救灾规模 

分 类 号：F840[经济管理—保险]