超越融贯论与内在论的知识证成观——对罗蒂式转向的批判性考察  

Epistemic Justification Beyond Coherentism and Internalism——Critical Assessment of Rortyan Turn

作　　者：王鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2012年第1期1-5,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：中国人民大学研究生科学研究基金项目资助(42306125)

摘　　要：罗蒂批判大写哲学而形成的"解释学"或"实用主义"的转向虽然遭到广泛的关注与批判,但其背后所包含的有关知识证成的论题并未得到太多深入的反思。罗蒂式转向的核心在于否认感觉经验对于知识证成的基础性作用,并进一步否定存在于世界与语言之间的任何形式的非因果关系。而这种做法具有深厚的理论支撑,那就是康德式的二元论。对罗蒂式转向的批判将不仅能向我们揭示出事实/规范、因果/证成的二元论的不足,并且能提供一个超越融贯论与内在论的有关知识证成的新视角。Though Rorty＇s ＂Hermeneutical＂ or ＂Pragmatic＂ turn formed by his critique of Philosophy （with the capital P） has received wide- spread attention and criticism, the thesis behind his turn which concerns epistemic justification has not gained enough reflection in China＇s context. The core of Rortyan turn lies at denying the basic role sense experience played in epistemic justification and further negation of any kind of non-causal relationship between world and language. This approach has profound theoretical support, and that is Kantian dualism. Critique of Rortyan turn can not only reveal the inadequacy of dualism between fact/norm, causal/justificatory, but also can provide a new junstificatory perspective which beyond eoherentism and internalism.

关 键 词：知识 因果 证成 经验 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]