基于企业对外直接投资动机的政企博弈分析  

Analysis of game between government and enterprise based on motivation of foreign direct investment

作　　者：李媛[1] 张晓晶[1] 王彧琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]沈阳工业大学经济学院,沈阳110870

出　　处：《沈阳工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第1期24-29,共6页Journal of Shenyang University of Technology(Social Sciences)

摘　　要：在后危机时代的背景下,欧美贸易保护主义再次抬头,出口企业面临的困难越来越多,一些有实力的企业在政府的鼓励下纷纷把目光投向国外,实施对外直接投资战略,以获得更广阔的发展空间。在建立对外直接投资中政企博弈模型的基础上,分别对无政府补贴情况下企业对外直接投资的条件和政府支持企业对外直接投资的条件进行分析,得出结论:相对于出口收益,政府和企业在对外直接投资中能得到更多的收益,而政府的鼓励政策将会帮助更多的企业走出国门。In the context of post-crisis era, the trade protectionism in Europe and America resurfaces again, and export enterprises are facing increasing difficulties. With the encouragement of governments, some strong enterprises cast their eyes to foreign countries and implement foreign direct investment strategy so as to get wider development space. The model of game between government and enterprise in foreign direct investment is constructed, based on which the terms are analyzed for enterprise to undertake foreign direct investment with or without the subsidy of government. The conclusion is that both the government and the enterprise can get more revenue in foreign direct investment than that in export, and encouragement policy of government will help more enterprises invest abroad.

关 键 词：对外贸易 对外直接投资 投资决策 投资条件 政府补贴 博弈模型 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F752.0[经济管理—国际贸易]