基于谈判机制的优质货架与通道费  

High Quality Shelf and Slotting Allowance with Bargaining Mechanism

作　　者：郑栋伟[1,2] 陈宏民[1] 杨剑侠[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]中国银联总公司产品创新部,上海200135 [3]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

出　　处：《管理评论》2012年第1期99-107,共9页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70672070);教育部人文社会科学规划项目(06JA630038)

摘　　要：大型零售企业能够收取通道费的重要基础在于它所提供的货架资源尤其是优质货架能够在较大程度上提升制造商的市场销量,改善制造商的经营状况,增加制造商的利润。本文以货架对消费者效用的影响机制为研究基础,构建了相应的需求函数,并通过三阶段动态博弈模型分析了货架对零售价格、市场销量、厂商利润的影响,然后从制造商、零售商的参与约束以及渠道成员的利益协调等角度出发,讨论了通道费的可能性、存在性与合理性,最后从消费者福利的角度对零售商收取通道费的行为提出了相应的政策建议。The basis for the retailers to charge slotting allowance is that it can enhance the sales and increase the profit of the manufacturer through the high-quality shelf. First, this paper models the demand function based on the influence mechanism for the consumer utility of high-quality shelf. Then, it analyzes the impact for the retail price, market sales and manufacturer＇s profits of the shelf space. Furthermore, we discuss possibility, existence and rationality according to the participation constraint of retailer and manufacturer as well as the profit distribution between the channel members. Finally, the paper gives some suggestions for the slotting allowance from the perspective of consumer welfare.

关 键 词：优质货架 讨价还价能力 通道费 市场效应 竞争效应 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F713.7