税收努力、征税机构与税收增长之谜  

Tax Effort,Tax Bureaus and the Puzzle of the Abnormal Tax Growth

作　　者：周黎安[1] 刘冲[1] 厉行[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院 [2]斯坦福大学经济系

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2011年第4期1-18,共18页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(批准号08&ZD026);国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目批准号70973004);北京大学光华管理学院县域经济与地方金融研究中心和印尼哈利达集团公司的资助

摘　　要：本文运用省级面板数据研究了中国税收收入高速增长的影响因素，主要考察了经济基本面和征税努力水平对于税收收入的影响。我们利用成对样本（paired sampling）的数据结构，使用工具变量处理了税收努力度量误差带来的内生性问题，估计了国税和地税机构的征税努力对于税收增长的不同影响。这种模型设定的好处是既考虑到一个地区的国税和地税面对着同样的经济基本面，同时又可以识别两个机构征税努力的增收效应所存在的差异。我们发现，GDP增长对于税收的增长有接近45％的解释力，征管努力对税收收入也有重要的贡献，地税局税收努力水平的边际效应要高于国税局的动际效应。Using provincial-level panel data, this paper examines the influencing factors of the abnormal tax growth in China, with special emphasis on the role of GDP growth and increased tax-collecting efforts. We construct a paired sample to investigate the differential impact of national and local tax bureaus. The advantage of a paired sampling structure is twofold： firstly, it recognizes the fact that these two bureaus are facing the same economic fundamentals within the same province, and secondly, it enables us to differentiate the returns to tax efforts exerted by national and local tax bureaus. We use the IV method to deal with the endogeneity of tax-collecting efforts. We find that GDP growth contributes about 45 percent of the tax growth. Tax-collecting efforts significantly contribute to the tax growth and the marginal effect of efforts by local tax bureaus is larger than that of national tax bureaus.

关 键 词：税收努力 征税机构 税收增长之谜 

分 类 号：F810.42[经济管理—财政学]