基于混合策略博弈的上市公司信息披露监管研究  

Research on Supervision on Information Disclosure Problems by Listed Companies Based on Mixed-strategy Game Theory

作　　者：丁琳娅[1] 吴凤平[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,南京210098

出　　处：《价值工程》2012年第4期122-123,共2页Value Engineering

摘　　要：证券市场是一个信息高度集约化的市场,但我国证券市场由于信息披露制度不完善、监管不到位等原因,内幕交易、操纵市场等事件不断发生,严重扰乱了市场秩序和损害了投资者利益。根据经济学中理性人假设,上市公司和监管机构都追求自身利益的最优化,相互作用过程中形成了博弈关系。The securities market is a market of highly information intensive.However there are kinds of problem in the development of China stock market,such as inside trading and market manipulation,causing major losses to investors,but also seriously disrupted the smooth functioning of the securities market.The root cause of these problems lies in institutional deficiencies and poor supervision.According hypothesis of rational man,the interaction process of listed companies and regulatory agencies to pursue their own interest optimization formed a game relationship.

关 键 词：上市公司 信息披露 监管 混合策略博弈 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]