从极端到综合:独占交易理论新进展  

A New Development of Exclusive Dealing

作　　者：黄建军[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院

出　　处：《产经评论》2012年第1期35-42,共8页Industrial Economic Review

摘　　要：本文通过文献解读和分析阐述独占交易理论的新进展,重点讨论了独占交易对竞争的影响、与共同代理的权衡、独占交易的完全排他与部分排他等三个问题。近年来关于独占交易理论的研究显得比较"中立"很多,不再从一个极端走向另一个极端。独占交易可能是反竞争的,也可能是社会有效的,要根据具体情况分析和综合考虑。经济文献中的线性价格模型夸大了独占交易的影响,现实中还需要综合考虑市场圈定效应和投资增进效应。独占交易契约的签订会对第三者产生负外部性,从第三者那里抽取的剩余会按照契约里的规定在签约双方进行分配。The new development of exclusive dealing theory is reviewed. The model with linear price in economic literatures would exaggerate the use of the exclusive transaction. In reality, how the exclusive dealing would affect competition needs to consider the market foreclosure effect and investment promotion effect together. The exclusive contract will generate negative externalities on the third party, and the surplus extracted from the third party will be shared between the two sides signed in accordance with the provisions of the exclusive contract.

关 键 词：独占交易 排他 共同代理 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]