基于历史业绩的风险投资报酬激励机制  

Compensation Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capital Based on Historical Performance

作　　者：李云飞[1,2] 周宗放[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054 [2]西华师范大学数学与信息学院,四川南充637002

出　　处：《软科学》2012年第1期55-58,共4页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971015);西华师范大学校基金资助项目(10A014)

摘　　要：针对有限合伙制风险投资基金运作过程中的道德风险问题,从风险投资者角度出发,对风险投资家的报酬激励机制设计问题进行了讨论。为此在两阶段情况下,引入风险投资家的第一阶段业绩作为先验信息来修正对其工作能力的判断,从而建立了风险投资家的报酬激励机制模型。理论研究结果表明,在基于风险投资家历史业绩的报酬激励机制下,风险投资家的努力程度要大于不考虑历史业绩下的努力程度;风险投资家在第二期基金中分享收益的份额大于他在第一期基金中分享收益的份额。因此,这种激励机制有效地刺激风险投资家在每期的基金运作管理中努力工作,降低了道德风险发生的可能性,为风险投资者制定合理有效的激励契约提供了理论依据。In view of the moral hazard problem in the course of venture capital,the design of a compensation incentive mechanism of venture capitalist is discussed from the perspective of venture investor.In the case of two stages,a compensation incentive mechanism model is set up based on the venture capitalist's historical performance which is used to adjust the judgment on the venture capitalist's ability as historic information.The theoretical researches show that the degree of endeavor of venture capitalist during the period affected by the historical performance is higher than that during the period not affected by the historical performance;the income share for venture capitalist during the second period is larger than that during the first period.The incentive mechanism is effective to inspire the venture capitalist to work hard during every period,which is helpful to solve the moral hazard problem.Based on the incentive mechanism model,venture investor can establish a reasonable incentive contract for venture capitalist.

关 键 词：风险投资 道德风险 历史业绩 报酬激励机制 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]