宏观调控下的农地规模经营补贴制度之路径选择——基于法经济学与法社会学的交叉分析  

Macroeconomic Regulation of Farmland Scale Operation Under the Subsidy Regime Route Choice——Law and Economics and Law Based on the Cross Analysis of Sociology

作　　者：郭继[1] 

机构地区：[1]淮阴师范学院法学院,江苏淮安223300

出　　处：《华中科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第1期35-40,85,共7页Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金重大招标项目(09&ZD043);国家社科基金一般项目(10BFX069)

摘　　要：市场机制下的农地规模经营以从事高效农业为目的,而直接补贴制度致使传统农业的规模经营成为可能。直接补贴制度所引致的传统农业规模经营并未实现确保国家粮食安全及农民整体收入增加之宏观调控的总体目标,反而产生了财政补贴的大量耗费、农民收入的再分配效应及农村不稳定隐患等不良后果。为了提高农地规模经营补贴制度的有效性,农地规模经营激励制度应变直接补贴制度为间接补贴制度。The market mechanism in the farmland scale operation in efficient agriculture as the condition,and direct subsidy system causes of traditional agriculture scale operation possible.Direct subsidy system dominance not realize traditional scale farm management to ensure food security for the nation and the entire income increase the overall target of macro-control,instead produced plenty of cost,financial subsidies farmers’ income redistribution effect and rural bad consequences,such as unstable hidden trouble.In order to improve the system of farmland scale operation effectiveness of subsidies,farmland scale management incentive system direct subsidies for indirect strain system of compensation system.

关 键 词：农地规模经营 直接补贴制度 法经济学 法社会学 

分 类 号：D922.32[政治法律—法学]